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In 1968, all across Western Europe, governments and regimes were rocked by a wave of protest movements that seemingly shared more than a coincidence of timing 1 . 2008, more so than any commemorative period thus far, saw a real drive to go beyond strictly national perspectives with much attention on the international dimension of revolts at this time 2 . The aim, it seems, is to address the question as to the existence of a common international/European revolt. An ever-growing list of countries and regions from all around the world that in some way fit the model of what happened in 1968 has emerged 3 . Despite the great contextual differences that set so many of these countries apart, a collective movement is increasingly perceived and described as characterising the revolts, thus lending weight to the ever-popular representation of 1968 as a year of international upheaval 4 .
2
The French revolt has emerged as that which is seen to typify the tumultuous events of that year 5 , with, as Gildea describes, the Latin Quarter of Paris as its "epicentre 6 ". There are several reasons to explain why this is the case. Amongst them is the fact that, unlike any other 1968 revolt, the French "May Days" were transformed from what was essentially a student-based movement into an all-out social crisis that threatened the hitherto extremely stable Gaullist regime. As such, it can be held up as an example of the explosive potential of what has been described a revolutionary period. However -and perhaps more significantly in this age of images, symbolism and aesthetics driven by technological advances that have led to a certain commemorative mediatisation of history and memory 7 -the characteristics of the conventional representations of the French events have helped mould an iconic image of what happened and one that is both romantic and attractive 8 . So starkly do these images contrast with current-day concerns that their appeal is unsurprising 9 . Just as events in Paris have monopolised the national memory of the 1968 in France -with obvious drawbacks 10 -the French revolt can be described as having done something similar in terms of the collective European memory of 1968.
3
One country that has not commonly been seen to sit comfortably as part of this international revolt is Northern Ireland (NI). Two possible conclusions could be drawn from the virtual absence of Northern Ireland from the long list of countries described as being affected by this international wave of revolt. Firstly, it could be assumed that there was no significant movement in 1968 in Northern Ireland. This is quite simply not the case. 1968 was to prove a pivotal year which, for many, marks the beginning of the "Troubles". Alternatively, it could be surmised that the movement in Northern Ireland does not fit the "68" mould. This article seeks to challenge this idea. Through a comparison with the French events of 1968, it will be argued that Northern Ireland should be included in the list of countries that make up this international upheaval. Reasons explaining why this has not been the case to date will be provided before a conclusion on how and why this is beginning to change.
From repression to election
France, May-June 1968 4 On 3 May 1968, following a period of disruption at the Nanterre campus in the Parisian suburbs, a band of militant students decided to take their protest to the heart of the French university system, the Sorbonne 11 . Reacting to a rumour of an imminent attack from the fascist Occident movement, they tore up tables and chairs in a bid to protect themselves. The subsequent decision to have them cleared from the courtyard of the Sorbonne was to become the starting point of one of the most important events in recent French history. The perceived mishandling of this situation by the forces of order sparked a riot in the student quarter and was the first in a week-long series of clashes 12 , culminating in the infamous Night of the Barricades on 10 May 13 . The heavy-handed tactics were so badly perceived by the public that a general strike was called for Monday 13 May, marking a transition of the student protest to one of the society as a whole 14 . By 20 May France was completely paralysed 15 . Previously reluctant, unwilling or completely overcome by the unfolding events, President de Gaulle and his Prime Minister Georges Pompidou made clear attempts to resolve the situation, and both failed 16 , leading to the most dangerous phase of the crisis. However, despite the brief threat of the revolt finding a political outlet, de Gaulle was eventually able to redress the situation and seemingly shake the population from its momentary folly 17 . On May 30, once back from his mysterious trip to Baden-Baden, he decided to address the population for a second time 18 and through allusions to the threat of totalitarianism and chaos turned the situation on its head. His dissolution of the Assembly and the calling of legislative elections marked the beginning of the end of the revolt 19 . The extraordinary turnaround was confirmed by the landslide Gaullist victory in the elections of 23 and 30 June 1968 20 .
5
Despite their ephemeral nature, the events of Mai 68 have become a reference point in French history and are considered as a watershed in the development of French society 21 . The French events cannot be considered in isolation to what was happening elsewhere at the time. In fact, they drew inspiration from, rode the wave of and contributed to an international revolt. The vast array of contextual differences from country to country problematises an explanation of what drove the common expression of frustration.
However, one pertinent line is that which refers to the "decline of deference 22 ." Stefan Collini describes the "sixties" as the culmination of a process of unprecedented socioeconomic and cultural change that brought about democratisation coupled with significant prosperity. Such seismic shifts led to the rules and traditions that hitherto governed society being exposed to question and criticism. The driving force behind this tension that exploded with such enthusiasm for change was the youth of the time who "realized that recent social changes meant that they no longer had to wait their turn: they could take over the place immediately 23 ". Whilst this interpretation refers to 1960s Britain, it could equally be applied to most of those Western European nations that experienced revolt in 1968 and points to an important transnational common denominator. This is particularly important when comparing France with Northern Ireland.
Northern Ireland, October 1968-February 1969 6 On 5 October 1968 the second march for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland took place in Duke Street, Derry. Attended by upwards of 2,000 people including a delegation from Queen's University Belfast (QUB), the march ended in terrible violence as the police -the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) -waded in with a heavy-hand and used brutal repression to enforce the previously imposed ban on the demonstration. The broadcasting of footage of the clashes on Radio Telefís Éireann (RTE, National television network of the Irish Republic) made sure of nationwide and international revulsion 24 . This march and the mishandling of it by the police had a profound impact on those QUB students present and would lay the foundations for the birth and emergence of a significant movement in the ensuing period of protest 25 . On 9 October 1968, a demonstration was organised by the students of QUB in protest against the police brutality in Derry. A meeting was later held at the University during which the People's Democracy (PD) was born. Led by a "faceless committee" which included a university lecturer 26 , graduates and undergraduates, this essentially student movement was officially launched on 11 October 1968. As well as quite specific demands related closely to those of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) 27 , the PD was concerned with raising awareness and lobbying the government on issues of social injustice and discrimination. In the initial phase this was achieved via provocative, non-violent acts intended to embarrass and force government representatives to consider the issues at hand 28 . As the movement gathered momentum it was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the non-violent approach and therefore continue to benefit from the public support they had enjoyed thus far 29 . Tensions were not only obvious from the exterior. It was becoming increasingly clear that there were difficulties within the ranks of the PD itself 30 . It was the episode of the "Long March" that while, on the one hand would ensure a critical place for the PD in the civil rights movement, on the other would expose the rifts that would eventually be the movement's greatest weakness. The idea of a "Long March" from Belfast to Derry had been discussed and provisionally planned for 14 December before being shelved. Its postponement was a direct consequence of a number of proposed reforms and the Northern Ireland Prime Minister Captain Terence O'Neill's famous "crossroads" speech 31 . Many saw this as a genuine attempt at making progress and an "unofficial referendum 32 "was organised by the Belfast Telegraph. Over 75.000 people filled in specially commissioned coupons from the newspaper declaring support for O'Neill. The moderate majority was able to force a truce during which no marches or direct action would take place 33 . However, for others this was proof of what could be achieved via direct action 34 . Such elements within the PD were able to force through a reversal of the decision to postpone the long march which was rescheduled to leave Belfast on 1 January 35 . The march set off with a very small number of participants and little public support. However, by the time it reached the Burntollet bridge on the outskirts of Derry, where it was met by a well organised and allegedly police-supported ambush 36 , participation and support had swollen, elevating those involved to the status of heroes and martyrs for the civil rights cause in Northern Ireland 37 . Despite this success, the subsequent violent backlash saw the PD accused of radicalising the civil rights movement and undermining the "steady, steady approach" of moderate elements thus far 38 . It was in the light of such tension and criticism that the PD decided to scale down its action and turn its attention to the next stage; the General Elections that Terence O'Neill was forced to call for 24 February 1969 39 . The PD decision to participate in this election was to prove a critical one. By entering into electoral politics -despite relative success in terms of votes -, the PD had moved to another stage in its development. Its originality was diluted and a process began that would end with the PD being subsumed into the more general revolt that would become the "Troubles". As Prince argues : "The old conflict over national and communal identities had been renewed. Northern Ireland's 68 had ended 40 ".
8
As well as originating as university-based movements, both periods of protest in Northern Ireland and in France were triggered in reaction against police brutality. Both were also brought to a close -in admittedly different ways -by general elections.
The following section will demonstrate that these are not the only parallels that can be drawn between Belfast and Paris in 1968.
Northern Ireland and France: comparable/common revolts? 9 It is clear that movements from around the world looked to each other for support and inspiration in terms of action, ideas or organisation 41 . The French movement certainly drew influence from similar movements in the USA, in West Germany and in Japan 42 . There were international issues (particularly the Vietnam War) that cultivated this notion of worldwide protest and fostered the idea of a shared, international revolt against a common enemy. In the years preceding 1968, politically active students at QUB such as Eamonn McCann, Cyril Toman and Michael Farrell had not only followed the development of this international protest movement but had also participated in meetings, conferences and demonstrations that had taken place. As Prince describes: "Northern Ireland was not under quarantine while the revolutionary contagion raged throughout the West 43 ." When the students of QUB started the new academic year of 1968-69 they cannot have been oblivious to what had been happening around the world in the preceding few months. When one considers the way in which the French events in particular were raked over in their immediate aftermath, it is no surprise that they "were fresh in the memory 44 ." Furthermore, the new university year started only three days following the decisive 5 October March in Derry thus offering the opportunity to the young people of Northern Ireland to book their place in this international revolt 45 .
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Similar root causes help explain why these young people may have felt they too should be part of this global wave of protest. 10 As had been the case in France in the years leading up to May 68, there had been, in Northern Ireland, a period described by Gibbon as "deceptively quiet" for "in fact, beneath the surface, the conditions for a major crisis had been accumulating for some time 46 ." De Gaulle's success in bringing an end to the Algerian crisis meant that in France the period from 1962-68 was one that saw the 5th Republic lay solid foundations and provide a long-awaited period of stability. 1962 was not without significance in Northern Ireland, for it was this year that marked the end of the IRA's six-year cross border campaign (operation Harvest) 47 . In both cases a period of violence and uncertainty gave way to one of relative calm. Generational and socio-economic changes at play during this time help explain why the revolts came along and why the university served as their starting points.
11 Northern Ireland, like France, had been enjoying relative political stability as well as the benefits brought about by the economic boom and the rise of the consumer society 48 . Such changes spurred young people to dare ask questions of and challenge the state of affairs. As Arthur explained to me, this example of the "decline of deference" meant that his "generation was not going to take what they [the older generation] had to take 49 ". In France opposition mounted vis-a-vis the elder statesman pacifying the population with consumer products as he pressed on with his notions of grandeur 50 . In Northern Ireland a new generation of young people (particularly from the catholic population) was becoming increasingly unwilling to accept the status quo of religious discrimination. In both countries, it was the spoils of socio-economic progress that fuelled the sense of revolt and provided the launch pad for the respective upheavals. 12 In France, the baby boom together with economic progress saw the university system opened up to welcome sectors of the society that had hitherto been denied such a privilege. These changes and the failure to cater for them are correctly cited as fundamental in explaining why this institution served as the spark for the French events
51
. The conditions of the higher education system provided the grounds from which its swelling masses could contemplate and critique society in general. Faculties such as Nanterre became perfect breeding grounds for discontent 52 . Similar changes can be delineated in Belfast. As Northern Ireland experienced an (albeit brief) spell of political and economic stability, a new element began to affirm itself in the echelons of the system of higher education 53 . A body of well-educated Catholics was now able to observe the frailties of the NI State and felt as though they were in a position to react. Gibbon explains how QUB provided an exceptional space from a NI perspective. The unsegregated nature of the institution meant that students -whilst increasingly aware of the shortcomings of the status quo -were freed from family/community hatred and bigotry and thus able to consider their plight from a broader perspective 54 . Consequently "[T]he world-wide wave of student revolt could not but have a violent impact on the one student group in the British Isles daily confronted with the repressive paraphernalia of a police state 55 ". With such evidently clear similarities in mind, it is no surprise then that closer examination of the action, language and general atmosphere of this period in Northern Ireland highlights even further correlation with the French events. 13 At the inaugural meeting of the PD on 9 October an undercurrent of frustration and desire for change was channelled through a system that, as Michael Farrell later admitted, was "considerably influenced by the Sorbonne assembly 56 . A faceless committee made up of students and staff of QUB was elected. Agendas were discussed and decided on by the meeting itself. Overall this "ultrademocratic structure" was to be a common feature of how the PD would make decisions and conduct itself 58 . Initially, this was one of the movement's greatest strengths, however, it was to be at the root of its downfall 59 . As had been the case in France 60 , the novelty of such action was the butt of much criticism from established bodies that deemed such organisational structures as unmanageable and inefficient 61 . These organisational similarities can hardly be viewed as merely coincidental. When one considers the timing along with the common traits it is clear that a certain degree of influence was sourced from abroad in similar movements 62 . As Paul Arthur explained to me : "A number of us were self-consciously following the French… the notion of meetings that went on and on, we believed that was part of what had happened in Paris 63 ." In order to understand why these tactics were imported with such ease one has to recognise the role of the media.
14 Radio, newspaper and television coverage was critical in creating the grounds whereby, Europe-wide, activists could situate themselves and their struggles in an international perspective 64 . The specific focus of international coverage on the spectacular elements of each revolt negated any real understanding of specific local contexts and instead encouraged militants to search for more general common denominators. The existence of any differences were glossed over as broader issues (anti-authoritarianism, the desire for wholesale change, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-war movements, etc) brought militants together, adding a degree of credibility to the respective upheavals through the belief that they each formed part of a broader, international wave of protest. Students in Belfast could not help but be inspired by the events of the previous spring in Paris -a fact evident when one considers some of the common action repertoires 65 .
15 Just as "la rue" was very important in France 66 , protest marches, punctuated with slogans and revolutionary songs, helped the rise to prominence of the PD in Northern Ireland. By insisting on the right to march, the inevitability of clashes with the police revealed the intention on behalf of certain student elements to provoke a violent reaction from the police that would in turn heighten the profile of the movement amongst the population and guarantee a certain degree of public sympathy and support 67 . The Nanterre example of "Provocation-Répression-Solidarité" was not lost on the PD. This provocation at times fed into an element of playfulness and youthful disdain for authority or "political theatre 68 " that conjures up images of the utopian, surrealist label so commonly attached to the French events 69 . The importation and adaptation of such tactics can be identified notably in the shared use of the deliberately provocative CRS=SS/ RUC=SS slogans. However, one of the most visibly striking similarities concerns the use of posters. The silk-screen prints produced in l'Ecole des Beaux-Arts in Paris in 1968 were immediately the source of much interest and have continued to be so, making them instantly recognisable and explaining why they form such an integral part of 1968 folklore 70 . Whether it is in relation to the technique used to produce the posters, their form or their content, when one considers several examples of PD posters the degree of influence is clear 71 . Those involved in the production of the posters have acknowledged the influence of Paris. For example, Joe Mulheron -member of the PD -described how the "images from France struck [him]"and how "the PD used them, ripped them off 72 ". The combination of such novel tactics may have gained some sympathy due to the freshness they brought to the political scene at the time. However, together with the notion of ultra democracy they helped isolate the PD from bodies such as the broader NICRA and significantly the Communist Party of Northern Ireland (CPNI). 16 As had been the case in France 73 , there was a difficult relationship between what the CPNI saw as irresponsible and potentially dangerous leftist elements and what the PD saw as an aging, conservative and incapable political force. Despite this problematic relationship with the CPNI, students (and particularly the more politically aware amongst them) were conscious that as long as their movement remained within the confines of the university milieu its general impact would always be limited 74 . Paul Arthur described one particular tactic that reveals the awareness of certain elements of the need to get the working class on board. He explained how students descended on a local social security office where hundreds of unemployed Catholics came to sign on for benefits in a bid to persuade them that their struggle was not simply a "student movement" but one that had to embrace everyone 75 . Such anecdotes cannot help but remind one of the (failed) attempts by Parisian students to strike up relations with Renault workers at Billancourt 76 .
17 Another area beyond the university milieu that reveals parallels concerns the respective states' reactions to the mounting tension and, in particular, decisions taken at the top of the governments. Both de Gaulle and O'Neill appeared on television calling on the "silent majority" in a bid to stem the tide of violence. The French president addressed the population on two occasions. The first (24 May) was a complete failure whilst the second (30 May) is widely regarded as the marking the beginning of the end of the French events 77 . Whilst the outcomes may have differed, in both instances the objectives were the same. The General wanted to offer the population a clear choice -"moi ou le chaos 78 ". O'Neill's "crossroads" speech was strikingly similar. He too presented the population with an ultimatum and like de Gaulle hoped to dispel tensions by presenting himself and the idea of order and stability as the logical alternative to the growing instability that had flared up in the preceding weeks 79 . Such tactics were -in the short-term -successful for de Gaulle and O'Neill but ultimately were hollow victories as in both their cases 1968 proved to mark the beginning of their respective spells at the top. Other parallels can be delineated within the corridors of power in Belfast and Paris. 18 Divisions at the top of government were important in deepening the crises in both countries. In France, the fact that the President and the Prime Minister both failed in their respective (and very different) attempts at putting an end to the crisis helped exacerbate the sentiment that the State was on the verge of collapse 80 . Such precariousness was heightened by -and can help explain -the degree of anxiety experienced when the General momentarily disappeared on 30 May. De Gaulle's trip to Baden-Baden not only sparked a brief period of panic, it also drove Georges Pompidou to offer his resignation. Whilst his offer was rejected, this episode nevertheless underlined the extent of the differences between the President and his Prime Minister 81 . Similar high-level tensions were discernable in NI. In the weeks building up to his 'Crossroads' speech, O'Neill had been coming under increasing internal pressure -and none less so than from William Craig 82 . The Home Affairs minister had been openly and increasingly critical of the PM's line in a clear attempt to wrestle control of the Unionist party. Whilst O'Neill was able to dispense with Craig in the light of the success of his televised address, the evident split revealed the extent of the pressure and in many respects mirrored what had happened in France.
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Études irlandaises, 36-1 | 2012 19 One final similarity is related to the attempts in both cases to portray the revolts as being conducted by an irresponsible minority in order to undermine the movement and divert potential sympathisers. This was a common feature of the tactic employed by the authorities in France 83 who at one stage claimed that the upheaval had been hijacked by what it described as la pègre 84 . In NI and in particular following the Long March, O'Neill was keen to play down any resonance this moment had within the community at large, "We've always had extreme Protestants and extreme Catholics -the anarchists and the Trotskyites are something new. About 95 per cent or even 99 per cent of the students don't want violence, but a small minority doesn't care 85 ". 20 On many levels, accounts of the time reveal a range of similarities in the language, atmosphere and conduct of the movement. One particularly pertinent example of this is the fact that in both Paris and Belfast the student revolt was not limited to a minor nucleus of hardcore militant students, even if it was being driven on by them. In fact, in both cases, the conditions were such that students who had until then remained on the fringes of or completely absent from political activity suddenly found a voice 86 . Police brutality incensed the general student population to such a degree that it compelled the average student to swell the ranks and as such provided an added dimension. Such commonalities (not to mention the internationalist perspective of people such as Paul Arthur who was both heavily involved in the PD as well as providing one of the most detailed accounts of the period) explain why when reading literature on how 1968 was experienced in QUB one could be forgiven for thinking that it was an account of events in Paris 87 . 21 One of reasons why the events in France have been such a focus of discussion over the last forty years is partly due to their "insaisissable" nature 88 . Since the immediate aftermath, commentators, participants and analysts have attempted to make sense of what occurred by searching for a single interpretation of these exceptional events leading to what Philippe Artières describes as "un gigantesque événement de papier 89 ". The "interpretation" debate has been the focus of much attention and numerous studies, but has yet to come to a conclusion upon which consensus has been reached 90 . However, one of those that comes closest to helping make sense of May-June 1968 is that which sees it as a "revelatory crisis"; the student revolt sparked and exacerbated by police brutality and state incompetence provided the platform for the society at large to express its disenchantment with a social, political and economic situation that had been hidden beneath a veneer of stability and contentment. As explained above, the "decline in deference" provided the impetus for young people in particular to dare expose such frailties in the quest for change. A similar interpretation could be applied to the contribution of the PD in Northern Ireland. Through its novel approach, its unorthodox organisation and daring actions, the PD was able to highlight the problems of a community and boost a struggle that had stagnated for some time. This is a view shared by some major protagonists of the movement. For example, Eamonn McCann explained, "there was an underlying crisis in Northern Ireland which was hidden and to a certain extent was brought to the surface by the events of 1968. … When the RUC attacked the civil rights march on October 5 in Duke Street all of those things suddenly erupted on to the surface 91 is left wondering why -if 1968 in Belfast was so similar to, and in many respects fits, the mould of the Parisian example -the former is so often absent from representations of this global revolt. The obvious answer would be to highlight the great contextual differences that existed between Northern Ireland and the rest of the world at the time.
The very specific circumstances of late 1960s Northern Ireland are such that it is understandable why commentators have refrained from including Belfast in the same breath as Rome, Paris, and Berlin 93 . And yet one cannot get away from the fact that in spite of such contextual differences, a "68-style" movement took place. Three elements in particular require consideration in order to understand why Belfast/NI 1968 is absent from the European collective memory of this year. 23 The first relates to the insular nature of Northern Ireland and its population. Due to geographical factors, and compounded by the idea that the NI problem was a case apart, what happens in Northern Ireland tends to be considered simply within its own context. As Paul Arthur explained, the fact that those involved were not "part of the metropolitan voice" has kept the NI movement out of the public eye 94 . Consequently, little or no effort has been made to frame the events of 1968 in Northern Ireland alongside those of other European countries. The role of those who spearheaded the '68 movement in situating the memory of these events is important nationally and consequently on an international scale. 24 If we continue to take the French events as an example, it is obvious just how significant the role of those involved has been in shaping the image of 1968 that has since permeated the collective memory of it 95 . In fact, one of the most striking features of the history of May 68 in France is the fact that even before the crisis ended, a trend emerged that would see the verbosity that so characterised the revolt itself be transformed into an avalanche of participants' accounts 96 . As the periodic reassessments of the 10 th , 20 th , 30 th and now 40 th anniversary celebrations have demonstrated, the participants continue to be a significant vector in how the story of 1968 is told 97 . People such as Cohn-Bendit, Serge July or Henri Weber appear to revel in recalling their participation in these events in what Rioux describes as a "gigantesque mai pride 98 ." This phenomenon has guaranteed a certain image of 1968 and propagated a perception of its impact on French society that has secured les événements a prominent place in the hearts and minds of the French. The same cannot be said for those that led the student movement of 1968 in Belfast. Such was the fallout of the 1968/69 period that any personal association with the PD created havoc with personal security and potential career prospects 99 . Therefore, unlike the French events which, almost immediately, were commemorated, celebrated and rendered mythical -largely by their very participants -the history of the PD has not been claimed with the same enthusiasm. This attitude is directly linked to the third and final reason that lies at the heart of why NI is so often absent from the long list of nations affected by the common, global 1968 revolt. French society 100 . Furthermore, during the 2007 Presidential election campaign, the future President Nicolas Sarkozy attacked the impact of 1968 on French society and declared his desire to have its influence liquidated once and for all 101 . The reaction to this attack speaks volumes for the opposition to the notion that 1968 was anything other than a positive moment 102 . A 2008 poll 103 confirmed the results as borne out by the 2003/4 survey as well as highlighting the widespread opposition (74% of those questioned) to the anti-'68 stance propagated by the President. It is clear then that the events of 1968 in France are considered as a positive moment, something to be celebrated and commemorated; a situation facilitated by the predominance of participants who are naturally keen to frame their actions positively, thus perpetuating the sanguine image.
26 In many respects it is this image of a positive moment that is dominant, not only in France but also across Europe and the world 104 . While much debate continues over the specific consequences of 1968 globally and on a national level, the overriding perception is one that holds it in a positive light as a watershed that helped move things forward. Once again however, and very significantly, this model is inapplicable to the case of Northern Ireland. The year 1968 marks the beginning of the "Troubles", i.e., over 30 years of sectarian violence that would so entrench religious divides that generations of peace building will be required before any genuine talk of normalcy can be taken seriously. With such a difference between the post-68 years it can be of no surprise that it is considered in a different light. The enthusiasm with which the French events have been and continue to be fought over has, not surprisingly, been absent in the case of Northern Ireland where there has been a distinct lack of the "commemorative industry" so prevalent in France 105 . There were no noteworthy 10th, 20th or 30th anniversary celebrations. The context in Northern Ireland was so particular that inevitably so too were the consequences. The very dark, depressing and gloomy post-68 trajectory of Northern Ireland is in such stark contrast to the positive, modernising, liberating representation of the post-68 era on a European level (as typified by France) that it really does not come as any surprise that Northern Ireland has been left on the sidelines of the European collective memory of 1968.
Conclusion
27 Nevertheless, as with most things in Northern Ireland in recent times, change appears to be on the horizon. The success of the NI peace process has altered how the past is perceived. Last year "The 40th anniversary" of 1968 in Northern Ireland was the focus of a series of commemorative events 106 . There was even a clamour amongst the various political parties to appropriate the memory of 1968. It could be argued that those involved (principally the SDLP and Sinn Fein) hardly represent Northern Ireland's soixante-huitards and that their involvement was one based on the gleaning some political capital. Nevertheless, the shift has been significant. The fact that genuine participants now feel capable of coming forward and telling the story of Northern Ireland's 1968 provides the grounds for the history and memory of the events to be brought in line with the broader European perspective. With peace now very much a reality, 1968 can and will be considered in a more positive light, as an important turning point and therefore able to fit the mould of the European 1968. This has been reflected in the beginning of academic interest in this question with conference papers and texts looking at NI 68 from a global perspective 107 . 
3.
As the above documentaries and conference programmes reveal, many countries were affected by the wave of protest including, Brazil, Mexico, the US, France, Italy, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Japan, China and many more. 
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